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Abstract 
We examine the validity of the guns versus butter hypothesis in the pre-Arab Spring era. 
Using panel data from 1995-2011—the eve of the Arab uprisings—we find no evidence 
that increased security needs as measured by the number of domestic terrorist attacks 
are complemented by increased military spending or more importantly ‘crowd-out’ 
government expenditure on key public goods such as health care. This suggests that 
both expenditure decisions were determined by other considerations at the 
government level. 
JEL Codes: C33, H52, H56, I15 
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1. Introduction 
Do security incidents lead to increased military expenditure and lower investment in 
vital public services such as health care? The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) 
provides an ideal context in which to examine this relationship. The region has been 
prone to conflict; high security needs and is home to six of the world’s top ten highest 
military spending countries. In addition, policy-makers and academics are searching for 
explanations of the 2011 Arab uprisings or ‘awakening’ and trying to understand how 
public policy decisions are made in the region. A more nuanced understanding of the 
policy-making process in the region, it is argued, could help in more effective targeting 
of external donor funding for development and humanitarian assistance. 
The widespread policy and academic view is that in a region renowned for protracted 
conflicts and terrorism MENA policy-makers have prioritized military and security 
expenditures, which has led to the subsequent neglect of wider public policy and social 
welfare, such as education and health, thereby increasing poverty and inequalities and 
creating the social and economic conditions for social unrest. It is argued that over the 
last forty years, Arab populations had accepted the ‘authoritarian bargain’ and the 
associated militarization of societies in return for domestic security at the expense of 
their social welfare and social mobility. However, the existing evidence is equivocal 
about the determinants of this relationship. The majority of studies have focused on 
OECD countries and provide mixed findings. Only a handful of studies have been 
identified in the MENA region, which find that increased military expenditure crowds-
out welfare spending on health and crowds-in spending on education. 
In this paper, panel data for 18 MENA countries is collated from the World Development 
Indicators database of the World Bank. Security needs are estimated using data on 
casualties resulting from terrorist attacks (number of deaths and serious injuries). This 
is retrieved from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) provided by the National 
Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). Previous 
studies on the MENA region have not considered security incidents as a potential driver 
of military expenditure. In contrast to existing studies of the military social welfare 
expenditure nexus that focus on OECD countries and use simple correlation analysis, we 
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provide an analytical framework based on regression analysis and the Panel Vector 
Auto Regressive model (PVAR) to systematically explore the trade-off between military 
and public health expenditures. 
Using panel data from 1995-2011—the eve of the Arab uprisings—we find no evidence 
that increased security needs as measured by the number of domestic terrorist attacks 
are complemented by increased military spending and thereby ‘crowd-out’ and reduce 
government expenditure on key public goods such as health care. We validate these 
findings with four additional modeling approaches: Generalized methods of moments 
(GMM), Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR), instrumental variable regressions, and 
Granger causality tests. The results indicate that, in the pre-Arab Spring period (1995-
2011), military expenditures did not lead to a decline in public health spending in the 
MENA region, which suggests that both expenditure decisions were determined by 
other considerations at the government level. Our results show that claims about the 
‘warfare versus welfare / guns versus butter’ hypotheses in the MENA are not so 
straightforward as many political scientists and regional commentators would like to 
believe. This relationship and the potential causes of the Arab uprisings require a far 
more nuanced and evidence-based understanding of decision-making and the political 
economy of policy-making in the region. 
The remainder of the paper unfolds as follows. In Section 2, we review the results from 
the literature on the guns and butter trade-off. In Section 3, we present some stylized 
facts on the military spending in the MENA region. In Section 4, we discuss the data and 
econometric methodology. In Section 5, we present the empirical findings while results 
from robustness checks are relegated to the supplemental appendix. Finally, Section 6 
provides some concluding remarks.                
2. Evidence of ‘Guns versus Butter’ 
Empirical evidence linking military and social expenditures assumes that defense 
spending is increased at the cost of other forms of public expenditure and concludes 
that “guns do come at the expense of butter” (Russett, 1969). The guns versus butter 
nexus defines a potential trade-off between military and social spending (e.g. public 
health, public education, welfare, etc.). The conclusion of Russett (1969, 1982) confirms 
what was, at the time, a widely held belief that spending on health and education is 
ACCEPTED FOR PUBLICATION IN THE JOURNAL OF DEFENCE AND PEACE 
ECONOMICS 
4 
negatively affected by military expenditure, particularly during times of conflict. 
Russett’s (1969) analysis is based on US spending between 1939-68 alongside France 
and the UK, which returned similar results. However, in studying Canada, Russett 
(1969) returned a positive set of results and so paved the way for an array of literature 
and analysis over 50 years, which has not led to a universal consensus for or against the 
‘gun vs butter’ hypothesis. For instance, Yildirim and Sezgin (2002) employ a SUR 
model in an effort to elucidate the relationship between military and social 
expenditures, focusing only on Turkey between 1924 and 1996. In line with the original 
theory, they also conclude that a trade-off exists between health and military spending; 
by contrast education spending indicated a positive relationship with military spending. 
They also propose that there is a sequential funding of health and education once 
military expenditure has been allocated. This idea was earlier discussed by Deger 
(1985) who had issued a warning that notoriously elusive endogenous expenditure 
decisions should be afforded priority when investigating the trade-off.1  
The military-welfare trade-off has been documented in a number of studies following 
Russett’s (1969) seminal work (e.g. Peroff and Podolak-Warren, 1979; Deger, 1985; 
Apostolakis, 1992, among others). Russett (1982) utilized time series analysis of the US 
case from 1941-71 in which he found that no relationship exists between social 
spending and military spending. Furthermore, Verner (1983) examined 18 Latin 
American countries in a time series analysis with linear and non-linear regression 
models and found that only in El Salvador there was a trade-off, in seven countries there 
was no trade-off, whilst in 10 countries a positive relationship was observed. It is clear 
that the the extant literature includes numerous analyses using a variety of 
methodologies in an effort to uncover conclusive evidence on the military-social trade-
off. Moreover, the applied methodologies have, necessarily, become more nuanced and 
complex. 
The post-Cold War era has not as yet provided a rich mine of evidence for the military-
social trade-off, particularly in direct comparison to the Cold war era; Neuman (1994) 
                                                 
1 The observation on sequential spending is also attributed to British Prime Minister Thatcher regarding 
the USSR and has subsequently been adopted by authors such as Reeves and Stuckler (2013) in their 
assessment of Israeli public spending priorities. 
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suggests the complexity of analysis now required is a significant factor in its paucity.2 
Combining cross-sectional and panel data is recommended by Lin et al. (2015) in order 
to provide an accurate examination of the trade-off. It is proposed that this addresses 
statistical problems related to heterogeneity across countries. Their findings from 32 
OECD countries between 1998 and 2005 suggest that defense expenditures crowd-out 
both health and education spending.  However, they remain equivocal about the 
relationship within non-OECD countries. Similarly, Reeves and Stuckler (2013) examine 
the relationship between military and health spending in 31 OECD countries including 
Israel. They assert that Israel practices a sequential spending principle which prioritizes 
military spending over other public spending due to its high security needs and high 
debt burden.3 The initial assumption regarding sequential spending is refuted in their 
analysis of 31 OECD countries which demonstrated a positive correlation between 
military and health spending over the past 30 years (r = 0.16, p < 0.01)4. The authors 
conclude that there is “no inevitable crowding out of public health from defense among 
high-income countries”.5 Additionally, the analysis shows that if high security needs and 
debt burdens determined military spending, the consequence would be that, during 
recessions, health spending should be reduced, while violent conflicts should increase 
military spending. The authors conclude that “in countries with high security needs, 
defense and health are complementary”.6 It is an interesting omission, however, that 
Israel is the only Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region country to be included in 
the analysis despite many neighbouring countries in the region reporting higher 
numbers of security incidents than Israel, as well as the fact that six of the world’s top 
ten military spenders (percentage of GDP) are located in the MENA region (See Table 1).  
[Table 1 near here] 
Finally, Elbadawi and Keefer (2014) examine the determinants of military expenditures 
in 140 countries using pooled OLS regression. They find that rising military spending in 
                                                 
2 Within the broader literature on the role of military expenditure, mixed evidence is found about the role of 
military expenditure and economic growth (Dunne, 1996; Dunne et al., 2005; Dunne and Tian, 2015; and 
d’Agostino et al., 2017). 
3 Reeves and Stuckler p.1. 
4 Ibid. 
5 Ibid 3. 
6 Ibid 3 
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the MENA region is mainly due to increased security risks in the region. However, as 
their focus is to understand the nexus of democratization, regional politics, and military 
expenses, they do not consider trade-offs between military and other types of 
expenditure. 
3. Military spending in the MENA region 
Looking at Table 1, in overall military expenditure, the global average is 1.9% of GDP 
with Saudi Arabia being the only MENA country registered in the top ten spenders in 
absolute terms. However, as a percentage share of GDP, MENA countries occupy six of 
the top ten positions worldwide (UN-ESCWA, 2014: 137; SIPRI, 2014). Oman tops the 
list at 10.84% of GDP while Saudi Arabia spends 8.52% of its GDP. In terms of global 
priorities, countries tend to spend the most on education followed by health and then 
the military. In the MENA region, the priority is also education, but the trend has been 
that of high spending on military and health; underlined by the fact that the MENA 
countries surpassed the global average on both (UN-ESCWA 2013: 15, 2014: 136-137). 
Gaub (2014) states that “had Arab States adjusted their military budgets to European 
levels in 1990—and maintained them—their economies would have grown by 2-3 per 
cent a year, and generated output levels over 50 per cent higher than at present.” 
Military expenditure in this regard is clearly seen as a heavy burden across the MENA 
region. A number of regional commentators have proposed that there is a clear trade-off 
between military and social expenditure although these assertions are based on limited 
evidence and simple correlation analysis (UN-ESCWA 2013: 167). To the best of our 
knowledge, only a handful of rigorous studies exist, which examine the trade-offs in the 
MENA region. Bauwens (2012) examines eight countries: Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Israel, 
Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, and Tunisia from 1990-2009. By employing the least squares 
dummy variable (LSDV) regression model, the results highlight a trade-off between 
military spending and social spending. It is found that a one percentage point increase 
in defense spending as a share of central government expenditures decreases 
educational spending by 1.04% and health spending by only 0.16%. 
                                                 
7 “Governments have focused almost exclusively on their own survival instead of the well-being of their own 
populations” (ESCWA 2013: 16). 
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Ali (2011) documents the experience of Egypt from 1987 to 2005 using a seemingly 
unrelated regression estimation (SUR) model. The study finds that higher military 
expenditure crowds-out (lowers) health spending and crowds-in (increases) spending 
on education. In a panel study of 16 MENA countries from 1987 to 2005, Ali (2012) 
further notes that military expenditures were found to reduce income inequalities. 
Similarly, Yildirim and Sezgin (2002) using SUR estimation methods of Turkish data 
between 1924-1996 document evidence of a trade-off (crowding-out) between military 
expenditure and health spending. These studies comment that providing explanations 
and a conceptual framework for the findings is difficult. A variety of pathways could be 
considered. First, the unstable and conflict-prone environment, which has come to 
dominate the region, has provided the opportunity for elites and policy-makers to 
justify increased security and military spending, ostensibly to curtail internal ‘terrorist’ 
threats, predominantly from militant organizations. Second, Ali (2012) argues that 
across the region the military and security services are so endemic within all aspects of 
a society and public services, which makes it challenging for researchers to extrapolate 
where exactly military spending begins and ends. For instance, which government 
entity deals with security incidents and counter-terrorism efforts? In many MENA 
countries this is usually managed by the security services, not the military. This makes 
analysis of military spending challenging as it is difficult to disaggregate and know how 
much of it is linked to counter-terrorism rather than traditional defense. Government 
spending on military and social welfare may also be influenced by the foreign policies of 
external international powers and associated donor agencies such as USAID, which aim 
to secure regional political stability at the expense of economic development and the 
social protection and wellbeing of domestic populations (UN-ESCWA 2013; Cammett et 
al., 2015; Daoud et al. 2017).  
4. Data and econometric model 
4.1. Data 
In this paper, we contribute to the existing literature by Ali (2011, 2012) and Bauwens 
(2012) by providing new empirical evidence from the MENA region focusing on the 
relationship between military expenditure and health. In contrast to Reeves and 
Stuckler (2013) who use bivariate correlation analysis on OECD countries, we deploy 
multivariate regression analysis to explore the trade-off between military and health 
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expenditures. We use annual data covering the pre-‘Arab Spring’ period 1995-2011. The 
data spans 18 MENA countries: Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Iran, Jordan, Kuwait, 
Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia (KSA), Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, 
United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Yemen. Data on total health expenditure defined as 
the percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and military expenditure defined as 
the percentage of GDP are taken from the World Development Indicators database 
provided by the World Bank. Data on casualties resulting from terrorist attacks 
(number of deaths and serious injuries) is retrieved from the Global Terrorism 
Database (GTD) provided by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and 
Responses to Terrorism (START). 
 
Ali (2012) recommends that in the analysis of the ‘warfare versus welfare’ hypothesis 
future studies should disaggregate social expenditures (education, health, food 
subsidies) in order to provide a more in-depth understanding of the relationship to 
military spending (cf. Nandy et al. 2016) In this article we therefore focus on health 
expenditure. 
 
Table 2 presents summary statistics of the variables used in the analysis for the whole 
panel over the period 1995-2011. The average values of total health expenditure and 
military expenditure are around 5% of GDP in the MENA region. The average number of 
deaths and serious injuries caused by terrorist attacks is equal to 347 per country per 
year. 
 
[Table 2 near here] 
   
Figure 1 plots the data on health and military spending in the MENA region in 2010. The 
negative relationship between military and health spending suggests that a trade-off 
exists. Countries with the highest level of military expenditure have the lowest levels of 
total health expenditure. More specifically, countries in the Gulf Cooperation Council 
(GCC) seem to have the largest trade-off. Our results from a simple correlation analysis 
are in line with these patterns. 
[Figure 1 near here] 
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4.2. Econometric model 
We use a vector autoregressive model with panel data (PVAR) to take into account the 
unobserved country heterogeneity in line with Holtz-Eakin et al. (1988). The PVAR 
model, in contrast to the simple correlation test, fully exploits the panel data nature of 
our dataset by considering simultaneously time series and cross sectional 
dependencies. In addition to overcoming the inefficiency of the pooled Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS), fixed effects (FE), and random effects (RE) models, this model does not 
suffer from the omitted-variable bias found in these models. Instead, the PVAR model 
assumes that all variables are endogenous. An additional advantage of the PVAR model 
is that it captures dynamic features by considering the lagged dependent variable 
among the covariates.  
The first order PVAR model is represented as follows: 
 
(1) 
 
In equation (1) is a (3x1) vector of three variables [total health expenditure, military 
expenditure, casualties due to terrorist attacks];  is a (3x1) vector of the lagged variables 
[total health expenditure, military expenditure, casualties due to terrorist attacks];  is a 
(3x1) vector and  is a (3x3) vector of the parameters to be estimated;  is a vector of 
country fixed effects;  a is vector of error terms. All the variables are considered to be 
endogenous ex ante.  
In applying the VAR procedure to panel data, we need to impose the restriction that the 
underlying structure is the same for each cross-sectional unit. Since this constraint is likely to 
be violated in practice, one way to overcome the restriction on parameters is to allow for 
‘individual heterogeneity’ in the levels of the variables by introducing fixed effects. Since the 
fixed effects are correlated with the regressors due to lags of the dependent variables, the 
mean-differencing procedure commonly used to eliminate fixed effects would create biased 
coefficients. To avoid this problem we use forward mean-differencing, also referred to as the 
‘Helmert procedure’ (see Arellano and Bover, 1995). This procedure removes only the 
forward mean, i.e. the mean of all the future observations available for each country-year. 
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This transformation preserves the orthogonality between transformed variables and lagged 
regressors.  
Before conducting the regression analysis, the statistical properties of the panel data 
used in the analysis are examined. We utilize three tests commonly adopted in the 
empirical literature to study the stationarity of the variables, which is a necessary step 
before estimating the relationships among the variables. This is done because using 
non-stationary variables may lead to spurious correlation. We run the panel versions of 
the classical Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) (Dickey and Fuller, 1981), the Phillips-
Perron (PP) (Phillips and Perron, 1988), and Im-Pesaran-Shin (2003) tests. The null 
hypothesis for these tests indicates the presence of non-stationarity. The results of 
these tests are presented in Table 3. The results show that the health expenditures 
variable is not stationary in level but becomes stationary when taking the first 
difference, we conclude that it is integrated of order one, I(1). The military expenditures 
variable is not stationary when looking at the ADF test, but stationary when using 
alternative tests. Using all three tests, the terrorist attacks variable is found to be 
stationary in level and therefore is integrated at order zero, I(0). Given our stationarity 
tests, we use the first difference of log level (growth rate) for each variable when 
estimating our model for consistency. 
  
[Table 3 near here] 
We explore additional models and methods often used in the literature in the supplemental 
appendix as a robustness check. We first run a SUR regression since researchers often use 
SUR to model trade-offs across different spending categories (e.g., Anderson and Blundell 
1982; Ali 2011, Kiviet and Schipp 1995; Yildirim and Szegin 2002; Hessami 2014; Zellner 
1962). In our case, we are interested in the trade-off between health and military expenditure. 
We thus run a system of two equations and allow for arbitrary cross-equation correlation to 
capture the impact of unobserved confounders that cause co-movement in both health and 
military expenditure. Terrorist attacks are considered an observable confounder. Second, we 
deploy in the appendix an instrumental variables framework in which the focal outcome is 
health expenditure and military spending is a potentially endogenous regressor. We introduce 
terrorism casualties as a plausible instrument for military expenditure, and use it to identify 
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the effect of military spending on health spending. Finally, we use a Granger causality test. 
Here, we test if past spending of military spending can predict current health expenditure. 
 
5. Empirical results 
Table 4 presents the PVAR estimation results. The variable total health expenditure is 
regressed on its own lagged value, military expenditure, and casualties due to terrorist 
attacks variables. We find that military expenditure has a negative but insignificant 
impact on total health expenditure. Although the result is in line with the simple 
correlation test, the statistical insignificance of military expenditures suggest that the 
negative correlation is spurious and therefore the results do not lend support to the 
‘crowding out’ hypothesis stating that governments that increase their military 
spending do so at the expense of their contribution to the total expenditure on health 
care in their respective economy. Taken together, our results indicate that, in the pre-
Arab Spring period 1995-2011, military expenditures did not crowd-out health 
expenditures in the MENA region, which suggests that both expenditure decisions were 
governed by other considerations at the government level. These results are also in 
contrast to those of Lin et al. (2015) who also use a regression analysis but for the OECD 
countries. Our results in Table 4 show that terrorist attacks and security incidents did 
not have any significant implications on the total health expenditure in the pre-Arab 
Spring period. 
 
[Table 4 near here] 
The robustness analyses—outlined in the supplemental appendix—reinforce the main 
finding: military spending does not crowd-out health spending. In the SUR model, we find no 
evidence for terror casualties to affect either health or military expenditure. Furthermore, 
there is a residual positive (rather than negative as the guns-versus-butter trade-off would 
suggest) correlation between health and military expenditure due to unobserved factors. In 
the instrumental variables regression, we find no evidence that changes in or levels of 
military expenditure affects health expenditure cuts. Lastly, Granger causality tests do not 
indicate that health and military spending can be predicted by each other, neither in levels nor 
in differences. Overall, these results lend overwhelming support to our main conclusion. 
6. Concluding remarks 
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Many studies have explored the potential trade-off between military and social 
expenditures (see Zhang et al. 2016 for full review). Given the use of different 
methodologies, datasets and country contexts and histories, the evidence available is 
mixed. In this paper we attempted to address the methodological weaknesses found in 
previous studies and to provide new evidence from the MENA region, which contributes 
to shedding some light on potential drivers of the 2011 ‘Arab Spring’ and the policy 
making process in the region. 
We note one limitation of our study. A null-result does not prove the absence of a 
relationship. In other words, military spending might affect health spending via 
pathways that our models have not captured. It could be the case that if there was any 
crowding-out effect of health spending, it could have occurred in the past, pre-1995. 
Given that the region has been conflict prone during the last century—such as civil war 
in Yemen 1994, Gulf war 1990-1991, followed by the Iraqi uprising in 1991, KDPI 
insurgency in Iran 1989-1996, Grand Mosque Seizure in Saudi Arabia 1979, Dhofar 
Rebellion in Oman 1962-1975, Lebanon civil war 1975-1990, Iran-Iraq war 1980-1988, 
and so the list continues—such a hypothesis carries substantial weight. The studies of 
Ali (2011) and (2012) using data from the MENA from 1987 to 2005 would lend 
support to this idea. However, empirically testing this hypothesis is difficult due to lack 
of reliable reporting of government expenditure data pre-1995 from across the 18 
MENA countries. We thus consider that our study contributes to the bricolage of 
evidence from the region and provides additional insights to those of Ali (2011, 2012) 
and the guns versus butter evidence base more broadly. The results can help orientate 
future research to explore the un-modeled pathways in the guns-versus-butter nexus, 
particularly in the MENA region.  
Our main finding is that the apparent trade-off reported between military and health 
spending is found to be spurious on the eve of the so-called Arab Spring (1995-2010). 
The analysis and results provide a cautionary note against the reliance on simple 
correlation analysis to draw important policy conclusions about the relationship 
between various government expenditures as reported elsewhere (See for example UN-
ESCWA 2013). Academics and policy makers should be careful in assuming that models 
and results from studies such as those of the OECD can be transplanted onto another 
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region such as that of the MENA without consideration of historical experiences and 
political economy factors. 
Determining the causes of unrest is a rather more complex empirical and policy task 
than envisioned by UN-ESCWA (2013) and those who claim there was an authoritarian 
bargain between MENA publics and their governments in order to maintain the status 
quo and security in a region beset by conflict (Desai et al., 2011). Moreover, the results 
suggest that support of MENA governments for the military and security apparatus 
prior to the ‘Arab Spring’ did not seem to play a role in crowding-out health 
expenditures: a finding that is contrary to that proposed by Lin et al. (2013). 
 
Further our results compliment those of Ali and Abdellatif (2013) who find in their 
study of military expenditure and natural resources in the MENA that the presence of 
regional conflict had no influence on rates of military spending. Our results further 
show that internal terrorist incidents and security needs had no effect on military 
expenditure. There are a number of possible explanations. It could be that this 
represents the fact that security needs and counter terrorism are not dealt with by the 
military and so would not be reflected in the expenditure. In many MENA countries, 
terrorism related threats are typically addressed by the ministries of interior or state 
security apparatus whose budget is not easy to disentangle from the aggregate national 
defense budget. Budgetary data on counter terrorism policies are difficult to access in 
the region given the political sensitivities. It could also be argued that security incidents 
and the occurrence of regional conflicts have become so normalized and routine in 
everyday life that their influence on policy-making decisions has become negligible 
when compared to other countries such as those of OECD who are exposed (relatively) 
far less and sometimes much more recently to an uptick in terrorism and security 
incidents. In other words, in the MENA region it could be the case that there has been a 
policy adaptation in which regional conflicts, high security needs and threats no longer 
are the main influence on government security and military spending decisions, which 
consequently could impact social welfare expenditures. To follow the finding of Reeves 
and Stuckler (2013) that ‘in countries with high security needs, defense and health are 
complementary’ we would caveat that this only applies to those countries which do not 
have a long history and experience of protracted conflict and security incidents. 
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Policy analysts and commentators on the region should not single out military or 
security spending and their prioritization as one of the main culprits for the lack of 
investment in public goods such as health and social protection more broadly. The 
results allude to the possibility that spending decisions on a vital public policy issue 
such as health are being made in silo, are determined by political will and affected by 
other government priorities and needs. This is a rather simplistic interpretation but 
lends support for the need for more research insights, both ethnographic and 
quantitative, on the political economy of health and public policy in general in the 
region. Without this we will be unable to fully understand the main drivers of change 
and transition post-2011. The MENA region has become more unstable and experienced 
numerous violent conflicts such as in Syria, Yemen and Libya, which have affected all 
countries in the region since 2011. What effects have these protracted conflicts had on 
government decision making in terms of social spending? Is the ‘warfare over welfare’ 
hypothesis a more accurate understanding of the situation since 2011? And have 
governments hunkered down and diverted government resources to defense and 
security in response and at the expense of the wellbeing and social welfare of their 
national populations? 
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Table 1. Top 10 military spenders  
Absolute 
Rank Country Millions of $ 
Relative 
rank Country 
Share of 
GDP 
Change 
in rank Country 
Percentage 
change 
since 2004 
1 USA 684489.2 1 Oman 10.84 1 Afghanistan 556.65 
2 China 148648.4 2 KSA 8.52 2 Azerbaijan 493.45 
3 Russia 73281.6 3 South Sudan 6.5 3 Iraq 284.46 
4 France 65263.6 4 Israel 6.14 4 Kazakhstan 247.93 
5 UK 60294.2 5 UAE 5.18 5 Ghana 243 
6 Japan 59638.4 6 Jordan 4.64 6 Georgia 229.85 
7 KSA 52019.2 7 USA 4.5 7 Liberia 189.13 
8 India 49261.2 8 Algeria 4.2 8 Algeria 176.21 
9 Germany  49080.4 9 Lebanon 4.2 9 Angola 175.12 
10 Italy 37025.2 10 Afghanistan 4.08 10 Ecuador 174.71 
 
Reproduced from ESCWA (2014: 136) Source: SIPRI, 2014. 
Notes: “Millions of $” (expressed in constant 2011 USD) and “share of GDP” are the five-year averages 
from 2009 to 2013. 
 
 
Table 2: Summary Statistics of variables, MENA region, 1995-2011 
 N Average Standard 
Deviation 
Min  Max 
Total health expenditure a  303     4.69 2.01 1.12 11.45 
Military expenditure b  271     4.81 2.74 0.92 14.62 
Casualties due to terrorist 
attacks c  
306     347 1635 0 15309 
 
  Notes: a, b Percentage of GDP.  c Number of deaths and serious injuries. 
 
 
Figure 1. Health and military expenditures in MENA countries, 2010 
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Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3. Panel stationarity tests of variables 
 Levels First differences 
Variables ADF PP IPS ADF PP IPS 
Total health expenditure 0.764 0.636 0.528 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Military expenditure 1.000 0.000 0.051 0.678 0.000 0.000 
Casualties due to terrorist attacks 0.002 0.000 
0.000 
0.000 0.000 
0.000 
Notes: The null hypothesis for the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF), the Phillips-Perron (PP), and 
Im-Peseran-Shin tests (IPS) is the presence of non-stationarity in all panels. p-values are reported. 
 
 
Table 4. Estimation results (Panel vector autoregressive model) 
Dependent variable: Total health expenditure 
Lagged dependent variable 0.082 
 (0.101) 
Military expenditure  -0.003 
 (0.052) 
Casualties due to terrorist attacks -0.001 
 (0.001) 
Number of observations 215 
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Notes: Statistical significance: *=10%; **=5%; ***=1%. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
Dependent variables are lagged at order 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Supplemental appendix 
To probe the robustness of our main findings, we present estimation results under alternative assumptions on the 
data-generating process. The models presented below are more specific than the PVAR models in the main text. 
A key concern is that with just 18 countries and 17 years in the sample, it is difficult to find significant results 
with too flexible estimators. Furthermore, the low number of observations limits us to a few additional tests. 
Following established practice and the results of our unit root tests, we estimate autoregressive distributed lag 
models in error correction representation throughout. In these models, the dependent variable is expressed in 
differences, while its lagged level is being controlled for. 
We examine permutations of the following three dimensions: 
 Data-generating process: We consider two alternative models that impose some structure upon the fully 
flexible PVAR model. 
 Control variables: We consider two sets of control variables—the empty set (as in the main text) and a 
set of basic controls, including (logged) terror casualties, infant mortality, and (logged) external 
resources for health. 
 Dependent variables: We consider two dependent variables—(logged) health expenditure (% GDP) and 
(logged) out-of-pocket health expenditure (% health expenditure). 
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Table A1 presents the descriptive statistics of all (untransformed) variables. 
Table A1. Descriptive statistics 
 Observations Mean Sd Min Max 
Health expenditure (% GDP) 303 4.69 2.01 1.12 11.45 
Out-of-pocket health expenditure (%) 303 36.78 19.33 10.11 99.61 
Military expenditure (% GDP) 271 4.81 2.74 0.92 14.62 
Terror casualties 306 347.06 1635.17 0 15309 
Infant mortality 306 23.64 15.12 5.60 79.50 
External resources for health 303 1.50 4.69 0.00 58.62 
 
 
A.1. Seemingly-unrelated regression   
Our first set of additional robustness tests makes the simplifying assumption that changes in health expenditure 
and military expenditure are both outcomes of interest that can be individually studied, but unobserved ‘third 
variables’ can induce spurious correlation between these two outcomes. Terrorist attacks are assumed to be 
exogenous. This data-generating process can be conveniently modelled with a seemingly-unrelated regression 
(SUR) system.  
In a SUR system, standard errors are allowed to correlate across equations. A positive correlation would indicate 
the presence of an unobserved factor that induces increases in both outcomes of interest, while a negative one 
indicates countervailing effects. For example, it is plausible to argue that a change in government ideology 
toward a more hawkish stance could decrease health expenses, whilst increasing military expenditure. The SUR 
framework allows us to detect cross-outcome correlation without the need to measure its sources. 
Table A2 presents the results when using health expenditure and military expenditure as our main dependent 
variables. Consistent with the main analysis, we find no evidence of crowding-out between health spending and 
military expenses. In fact, the cross-outcome correlation is estimated to be significantly positive (p<0.01). This 
suggests existence of an unmeasured variable that positively relates to both types of spending. For example, 
spending on police forces is a likely confounder. To avoid future terrorist attacks, the government likely spends 
on both military and the police force including its counterterrorism units.  
Turning to control variables, we do not find evidence for significant relationships between terror casualties and 
health expenditure and military expenditure, respectively. In contrast, external resources for health substitute for 
domestic health spending as well as military spending (p<0.01). A higher lagged level of infant mortality is 
negatively related to the growth in health expenditure, most likely because states with problems to expedite 
health spending have weak state capacity to begin with. This interpretation—lack of absorptive capacity—is 
also consistent with the negative coefficient on the level of external resources for health in both equations. In 
sum, the models are reasonably specified, explaining about one-third of the variation in health expenditure 
change. 
Table A2. SUR results using health expenditure 
 (1)  (2)  (3)              
 b se b se b se 
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.Health expenditure                   
L.Health expenditure -0.252*** (0.025) -0.283*** (0.053) -0.334*** (0.059) 
.Terror casualties   0.017 (0.012) 0.015 (0.010) 
L.Terror casualties   0.021 (0.019) 0.018 (0.017) 
.Infant mortality     -0.062 (0.040) 
L.Infant mortality     -0.007** (0.003) 
.External resources     -0.010*** (0.001) 
L.External resources     -0.008*** (0.001) 
.Military expenditure                   
L.Military expenditure -0.337*** (0.047) -0.341*** (0.049) -0.355*** (0.049) 
.Terror   -0.002 (0.007) -0.002 (0.006) 
L.Terror   0.002 (0.010) 0.001 (0.009) 
.Infant mortality     -0.045 (0.051) 
L.Infant mortality     -0.005 (0.005) 
.External resources     -0.011*** (0.002) 
L.External resources     -0.007* (0.004) 
Cross-outcome correlation 0.46***  0.47***  0.43***              
Observations 287  287  285              
Within R-squared 0.29  0.31  0.36              
 
Notes: SUR system of equation estimation using maximum likelihood. Both 
equations include two-way fixed effects. Standard errors clustered on countries. 
Significance levels: * p<.1  ** p<.05  *** p<.01. 
 
Table A3 repeats the analysis from Table A2 but using out-of-pocket health expenditure as the first outcome of 
interest. The main conclusions from the analysis are unaffected. Conditional on observed control variables, both 
outcomes are not significantly correlated with each other (the point estimate is close to zero). The coefficients of 
terror casualties are not significant. In terms of additional controls, we find that an increase in the growth of 
external resources for health positively relates to an increase in the out-of-pocket share of health expenditure 
(p<0.01). This can again be taken as suggestive evidence that governments reduce public health expenditure 
when external resources are ready to fill the gap.  
Table A3. SUR results with out-of-pocket health expenditure 
 (1)  (2)  (3)              
 b se b se b se 
.Out-of-pocket expenditure                
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L.Out-of-pocket expenditure -0.087*** (0.020) -0.087*** (0.021) -0.130*** (0.016) 
.Terror casualties   -0.195 (0.388) -0.166 (0.373) 
L.Terror casualties   -0.034 (0.343) 0.037 (0.328) 
.Infant mortality     -0.783 (1.269) 
L.Infant mortality     -0.231 (0.141) 
.External resources     0.191*** (0.027) 
L.External resources     0.211*** (0.051) 
.Military expenditure                
L.Military expenditure -0.298*** (0.051) -0.297*** (0.051) -0.312*** (0.054) 
.Terror casualties   -0.006 (0.006) -0.005 (0.006) 
L.Terror casualties   -0.005 (0.006) -0.004 (0.006) 
.Infant mortality     -0.026 (0.051) 
L.Infant mortality     -0.004 (0.005) 
.External resources     -0.012*** (0.002) 
L.External resources     -0.008** (0.004) 
Cross-outcome correlation -0.05  -0.04  -0.01  
Observations 287  287  287  
Within R-squared 0.10  0.10  0.14  
 
Notes: SUR system of equation estimation using maximum likelihood. Both 
equations include two-way fixed effects. Standard errors clustered on countries. 
Significance levels: * p<.1  ** p<.05  *** p<.01. 
 
A.2. A direct test of the crowding-out hypothesis  
In a second set of analyses, we consider health expenditure as our unique outcome of interest and military 
expenditure to be a (potentially endogenous) regressor. This setup allows us to directly assess whether there is a 
significant negative correlation between the two variables (equivalent to a crowding-effect). We are not 
concerned about reverse causality as a source of endogeneity (a negative correlation is evidence of crowding-
out). However, we must beware of endogeneity due to omitted variables. A standard solution to this is an 
instrumental-variable design, in which we try to find a variable that correlates with military expenditure but 
affects health expenditure only through its effect on the former.  
Terror casualties are not an implausible instrument. Assuming that casualties are never significant enough to 
directly cause increases in public health spending, they are theoretically strongly related to military spending 
because governments can use terrorism as a pretext to reallocate scarce public resource to the military (Daoud 
2011, 2017, 2018). Our approach in this set of analyses hence is to instrument military spending with terror 
casualties and study whether (predicted) military spending is negatively related to health expenditure.  
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Table A4 shows the results for health expenditure as a percentage of GDP. We find that there never is a 
significantly negative relationship between military spending and health expenditure (in fact, in the last two 
models, it is positive). Yet, we caution against over-interpretation of these findings because the instruments are 
weak, considering conventional levels of statistical significance. Neither are any of the control variables 
significant. 
Table A5 repeats the analysis using out-of-pocket health expenditure as outcome of interest. The results are 
similar, at the exception of the first model in which the coefficient on the level of military expenditure is 
negatively related to the change in health spending. This is not evidence of crowding-out though. 
Table A4. IV design using health expenditure 
 (1)  (2)  (3)              (4)              
 b se b se b se b se 
.Health expenditure                     
L.Health expenditure -0.291*** (0.081) -0.329*** (0.087) -0.291*** (0.081) -0.329*** (0.087) 
.Military expenditure -1.018 (0.871) -1.084 (1.452) -0.994 (0.983) -0.959 (0.913) 
L.Military expenditure 0.801 (4.698) 1.036 (4.178) 0.196*** (0.053) 0.200*** (0.050) 
L.Infant mortality   0.005 (0.048)   -0.004 (0.005) 
L.External resources   0.002 (0.013)   -0.000 (0.004) 
L.Military expenditure                     
L.Terror casualties -0.003 (0.016) -0.001 (0.012)                 
.Terror casualties -0.000 (0.006) -0.000 (0.008)                 
L.Infant mortality   -0.011 (0.014)                 
L.External resources   -0.002 (0.007)                 
.Military expenditure                     
.Terror casualties -0.006 (0.005) -0.006 (0.005) -0.007 (0.005) -0.007 (0.005) 
L.Terror casualties -0.004 (0.005) -0.004 (0.005) -0.003 (0.003) -0.004 (0.004) 
L.Infant mortality   0.001 (0.002)   0.001 (0.002) 
L.External resources   0 0   0.001 (0.003) 
Cross-equation correlation -1.05  -1.05  1.35*  1.32***              
ACCEPTED FOR PUBLICATION IN THE JOURNAL OF DEFENCE AND PEACE 
ECONOMICS 
26 
Observations 260  259  253  252              
Within-R2 0.42  0.43  0.40  0.40              
 
Notes: Recursive system of equations, estimated using maximum likelihood. Military expenditure is 
modelled using terrorist casualties in levels and differences as instruments. Models 1-2 instrument 
both level and difference in military expenditure. Models 3-4 only instrument the difference. All 
equations include two-way fixed effects. Standard errors clustered on countries. 
Significance levels: * p<.1  ** p<.05  *** p<.01. 
 
Table A5. IV design using out-of-pocket expenditure 
 (2)  (3)              (4)              
 b se b se b se 
.Out-of-pocket expenditure                   
L.Out-of-pocket expenditure -0.210*** (0.029) -0.210*** (0.031) -0.210*** (0.029) 
.Military expenditure -35.534 (38.769) -32.953 (26.375) -35.112 (27.453) 
L.Military expenditure -7.754** (3.480) -0.181 (1.234) -0.385 (1.267) 
L.Infant mortality -0.143 (0.121)   -0.061 (0.136) 
L.External resources -0.015 (0.278)   -0.003 (0.259) 
L.Military expenditure       
L.Terror casualties -0.001 (0.017)                 
.Terror casualties -0.001 (0.006)                 
L.Infant mortality -0.011 (0.014)                 
L.External resources -0.002 (0.007)                 
.Military expenditure       
.Terror casualties -0.006 (0.006) -0.006 (0.005) -0.006 (0.005) 
L.Terror casualties -0.007* (0.004) -0.007 (0.004) -0.007 (0.004) 
L.Infant mortality 0.001 (0.002)   0.001 (0.002) 
L.External resources 0.001 (0.003)   0.001 (0.003) 
Cross-equation correlation -0.12  1.25**  1.31*  
Observations 259  253  252  
Within-R2 0.19  0.22  0.23  
 
Notes: Recursive system of equations, estimated using maximum likelihood. 
Military expenditure is modelled using terrorist casualties in levels and 
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differences as instruments. Models 1 (equivalent to A4) dropped due to non-
convergence. All equations include two-way fixed effects. Standard errors 
clustered on countries. 
Significance levels: * p<.1  ** p<.05  *** p<.01. 
 
A.3. Granger causality test 
A final test to demonstrate that health expenditure and military expenditure are not related to each other in our 
sample is a Granger causality test. For instance, if past realizations of military spending could predict current 
health expenditure (controlling for past health spending), but past realizations of health spending would not 
predict current military expenditure (controlling for its past realizations), then military spending Granger-causes 
health spending. 
We do not find evidence for variable to Granger-cause the other, neither in levels, nor in changes (Table A6). 
This is additional supportive evidence for our main finding that there is no crowding-out between the two 
variables.  
Table A6: Granger tests 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)              
 Health expenditure Military expenditure Health expenditure Military expenditure 
 b se b se b se b se 
Levels         
L.Health 0.608*** (0.078) 0.035 (0.094)                 
L2.Health 0.092 (0.095) 0.138 (0.116)                 
L3.Health 0.043 (0.073) -0.038 (0.089)                 
L.Military 0.100 (0.067) 0.775*** (0.084)                 
L2.Military -0.098 (0.080) -0.233** (0.099)                 
L3.Military 0.031 (0.060) 0.071 (0.074)                 
Differences         
L.Health     -0.346*** (0.084) -0.006 (0.103) 
L2.Health     -0.222*** (0.082) 0.091 (0.102) 
L3.Health     -0.072 (0.083) -0.023 (0.106) 
L.Military     0.132** (0.065) -0.068 (0.086) 
L2.Military     0.016 (0.065) -0.296*** (0.083) 
L3.Military     -0.044 (0.063) -0.205*** (0.078) 
N 222  216  204  198              
 
Notes: Fixed-effects regressions with two-way fixed effects. Standard errors clustered on countries. 
Significance levels: * p<.1  ** p<.05  *** p<.01. 
